

~~SECRET~~

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)  
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


*copy*  
*cmte* 19-25X1



DCI/ICS 0851-87  
20 May 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: IG/CM(P) Members

FROM:

  
Executive Secretary

25X1

SUBJECT: Draft Minutes--Seventh IG/CM(P) Meeting, 12 May 1987

Attached for your information is a copy of the draft minutes of the 12 May 1987 IG/CM(P) meeting. If changes/corrections are not received by cob 28 May 1987, the minutes will be considered final.

25X1

Attachment:  
a/s

Regraded Unclassified upon  
removal of classified attachment

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET  
NOFORN

SUMMARY OF IG/CM(P) MEETING  
12 MAY 1987  
ROOM 6W02, COMMUNITY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

1. The seventh meeting of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy) was convened at 1400 hours, 12 May 1987, by the Chairman, Mr. Craig Alderman, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). A list of individuals attending is at Attachment 1. (U)

2. The Chairman made the following opening remarks:

a. Minutes of the sixth IG/CM(P) meeting have been corrected and are now considered final. (U)

b. Members should be aware that an effort is made to establish the date of the next IG/CM(P) meeting in the penultimate paragraph of the minutes of each meeting. This procedure is intended as an aid to planning and should be appropriately noted. An independent announcement and agenda for each meeting will continue to be provided as far in advance of each meeting as is practical. (U)

3. The scheduled agenda was addressed with the following results:

a. ISOO Directive No. 1: Prior to the meeting, attendees were provided a recommended change to ISOO Directive No. 1 (Attachment 2). The change was occasioned by the results of a recent study on combination lock vulnerability. Mr. Steve Garfinkel, ISOO, advised that the change, formulated in large part from IG/CM(P) member input, outlines additional minimum protective measures only for Top Secret material stored overseas. The Chairman asked if all were in agreement with the change. After considerable discussion, consensus was obtained. (S/NF)

Representatives from CIA and the NSC opined that the regulation should also specify additional minimum protection for storage of US classified information within the United States. Representatives from all the military departments and agencies disagreed. The Chairman reiterated that the minimum standards for protecting classified information must focus only on what needs to be done. He indicated that this determination was a function of assessing the vulnerability to the threat. The

CL BY 2023607  
DECL OADR  
DRV FM SEC 8-82  
and COV 1-82

NOFORN  
SECRET

SECRET  
NOFORN

consensus has been that in the United States, the threat is currently low while overseas, it is higher. He observed that both threat and vulnerability were dynamic dimensions, but the consensus had been that by the time the threat level rises in CONUS, we will have developed improved locking devices to challenge that threat. Mr. Garfinkel noted that the ISOO directive promulgates minimum standards that most agencies already voluntarily exceed. Mr. Anderson, DoD, stressed that the most pertinent downside to officially adding increased standards to be applicable within the United States was increased costs. (S/NF)

**ACTION:** ISOO should prepare to provide the recommended change to ISOO Directive No. 1 to the National Security Council, indicating IG/CM(P) consensus to the change. ISOO forwarding of the recommended change will be contingent upon concurrence of the Chairman, SIG-I, which will be sought by the secretariat by 5 June 1987 (U)

b. **Press Release:** The Chairman noted that members had received, for comment, a proposed press release on the combination lock issue. He stressed that his guidance to prepare such a release was governed by contingency planning considerations. The staff, in response, prepared a strawman that was given to the Physical Security Committee (PhySC) to develop a draft for IG/CM(P) consideration. In addition to the draft release, the PhySC also prepared questions and answers for use by any official who might issue the press statement. The Chairman concluded by requesting discussion on the adequacy and wisdom of the statement, the appropriate agency to issue the statement, and the timing of its issuance. (C)

25X1

[ ] CIA, questioned the need to go public at all, indicating the belief that a "no comment" response to potential inquiries on this national security-related issue seemed adequate. The Chairman indicated an IG/CM(P) obligation to examine several sides of the issue, including positions of: no comment; contingency response (only when have to respond); and routine notice (upon issuance of any ISOO directive change). There was general agreement that the nature of the issue and the current public prominence of security concerns mitigated against a "no comment" position. Development of some form of well-thought-out and coordinated notice, on the other hand, received consensus. (C)

25X1

25X1  
25X6

Ms. Lawton, DoJ, offered three opinions. First, reference to a study in any form of a public notice should be avoided since it would surely trigger Freedom of Information Act requests for the classified study; second, the change to the ISOO directive, if approved, would have to be listed in the Federal Register where it must be accompanied by a preamble explaining the change. This preamble can constitute the locus of the substance contained in the proposed press release; and third, any more detailed notice to those individuals depending on the security of

NOFORN  
SECRET

SECRET  
NOFORN

combination locks can be conveyed in an ISOO or GSA classified notice to security officers. There was general acceptance of these points. (S)

The IG/CM(P) Chairman opined that from a contingency viewpoint, the standby press release might still prove useful. He accordingly asked the PhySC to redraft its recommended product to better emphasize the positive side of the lock issue and eliminate reference to the lock vulnerability study. He observed that the draft release might also form the nucleus for any preamble required if ISOO Directive No. 1 is changed. (S/NF)

**ACTION:** PhySC is to have a redraft of the press release completed by 26 June. An advance copy should be directly provided to ISOO. (U)

Mr. Garfinkel indicated that ISOO has several means of contacting affected agencies and departments, and recommended that any classified communication from ISOO be sent through his channel to "senior officials." The Chairman sought and obtained consensus on ISOO preparing a detailed classified notice to combination lock users in the Federal Government. Mr. Rubino, DoJ, cautioned that any notice regarding combination lock vulnerability sent to security officials must give as much information and context as possible so that recipients can make informed judgments about what should be done. The Chairman agreed, indicating that the thrust of the message should be: "Heads up--consider increased protection for very sensitive information other than just from combination locks." (S/NF)

**ACTION:** ISOO is to prepare a classified notice to Federal Government users of combination locks for information security, apprising of the discovered vulnerability and suggesting low-cost initiatives that would afford increased protection to classified information. The draft action should be coordinated with appropriate legal counsel and should be submitted for IG/CM(P) coordination prior to release. The target date for completion of the draft is 26 June 1987. (S/NF)

The Chairman discussed the requirements of apprising the Chairman, SIG-I, and the Congress of the status of the combination lock vulnerability actions. Prior to going final with any initiatives, he requested that the Secretariat prepare a memorandum to the Chairman, SIG-I, summarizing the problem and outlining all courses of action proposed in ISOO and IG/CM(P) deliberations to date. He indicated a subsequent intent to appropriately inform the staff directors of the Congressional intelligence oversight committees prior to promulgation of any ISOO change to its directive. (S/NF)

**ACTION:** The Secretariat will prepare the cited memorandum for the Chairman, SIG-I, by 5 June 1987. (U)

NOFORN  
SECRET

SECRET  
NOFORN

The Chairman sought and obtained IG/CM(P) consensus that the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) continue its work toward both assessing the viability of current combination lock standards and developing new locks to counter present vulnerabilities. (C)

ACTION: The Physical Security Committee will monitor combination lock actions of the NCEL and keep the IG/CM(P) advised of developments. (C)

c. Counterimagery NSDD: The previously coordinated counterimagery draft, which accommodates in writing those changes agreed to at previous meetings, was distributed to attendees. The Chairman emphasized that this was a coordinated draft being provided for information only. (U)

ACTION: None. (U)

4. NEXT MEETING: The next IG/CM(P) meeting is tentatively scheduled for 7 July 1987. (U)

5. ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 1525 hours. (U)

NOFORN  
SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Attachment 1

ATTENDEES  
IG/CM(P) MEETING, 12 MAY 1987  
ROOM 6W02, COMMUNITY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

25X1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	
ALDERMAN, Craig	OSD	
ALLEN, Robert C.	Navy	
ANDERSON, Maynard	OSD	
	CIA	
BRANDT, Fred	State	25X1
BURNS, Thomas	FBI	
CASSETTA, Michael	Commerce	
DONNELLY, John F.	OSD	
	ICS	
FOSS, Robert T.	Treasury	25X1
GALLO, Anthony	Army	
GARFINKEL, Steven	IS00	
GUENTHER, John	Marine Corps	25X1
HOOVER, John	OSD	
KONDURIS, Ted	Air Force	
LAWTON, Mary C.	Justice	
	CIA	
MAJOR, David	NSC	25X1
	NSA	
	ICS	25X1
	ICS	25X1
RUBINO, D. Jerry	Justice	
SCLAFANI, Frances	OPM	
SMITH, Jean	OSD	
	NSA	
WADDY, Rudolph	IS00	25X1
	ICS	25X1
	DIA	
WILLIAMS, John	Coast Guard	25X1

CONFIDENTIAL



Information Security Oversight Office  
Washington, DC 20405

ATTACHMENT 2

May 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Craig Alderman, Jr.  
Chairman, IGCM(P)

FROM: Steven Garfinkel  STAT

SUBJECT: Amendment of ISOO Directive No. 1

The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) has considered proposed changes to the minimum storage requirements for national security information as provided in its Directive No. 1. Based upon agency comments and its own evaluation of the situation, ISOO is tentatively prepared to seek the approval of the National Security Council for the change below. At your discretion, we are also prepared to discuss this change at the next meeting of the IGCM(P) before submitting it to the NSC.

§ 2001.43 Storage

\*

\*

\*

(a) Minimum requirements for physical barriers.  
(1) Top Secret. Top Secret information shall be stored in a GSA-approved security container with an approved, built-in, three-position, dial-type changeable combination lock; in a vault protected by an alarm system and response force; or in other types of storage facilities that meet the standards for Top Secret established under the provisions of § 2001.41. For Top Secret information stored outside the United States, one or more of the following supplementary controls is required:  
(i) the area that houses the security container or vault shall be subject to the continuous protection of guard or duty personnel; (ii) guard or duty personnel shall inspect the security container or vault at least once every two hours; or (iii) the security container or vault shall be controlled by an alarm system to which a force will respond in person within 15 minutes. In addition, heads of agencies shall prescribe those supplementary controls deemed necessary to restrict unauthorized access to areas in which such information is stored.

UNCLASSIFIED

CCISCMO/ICS

STAT

Distribution of D/ICS 0851-87 (w/atts as shown):

1 - Mr. Alderman, OSD  
1 - Mr. Donnelly, ODUSD(P)  
1 - Mr. Anderson, ODUSD(P)  
1 - Mr. Latham, ASD C3I  
1 - COL Gallo, OACSI, DA  
1 - RADM Flynn, Navy  
1 - Ms. Smith, Air Force  
1 - Mr. Guenther, Marine Corps  
1 - CDR Williams, Coast Guard  
2 - Mr. [redacted] (one for JCS)  
1 - Mr. [redacted]  
1 - Mr. Penrith, FBI  
1 - Mr. Corry, State  
1 - Mr. Lamb, State (via Mr. Corry)  
1 - Mr. Major, NSC  
1 - Dr. [redacted]  
1 - Mr. [redacted]  
1 - Ms. Lawton, DoJ  
1 - Mr. Cassetta, Commerce  
1 - Mr. Seaton, Energy (via Mr. Brown)  
1 - Mr. Foss, Treasury  
1 - Mr. Garfinkel, ISOO  
1 - Ms. Sciafani, OPM (HOLD IN CCISCMO/ICS)  
1 - ADCI  
1 - ER  
1 - D/ICS (via DD/ICS)  
1 - ICS Registry  
1 - IG/CM subject  
1 - IG/CM chrono

STAT  
STAT

STAT

UNCLASSIFIED